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Forum Introduction by the Editor
The forum in this issue, guest edited by Dennis Schoeneborn and Steffen 
Blaschke, is organized to expound the conception of communicative consti-
tution of organizations (CCOs) in different schools of thought. Scholars 
working on base of different theory traditions participate in the discussion. 
The dialogue unfolds as contributors compare notes on fundamentals, includ-
ing their approaches to and positions on theoretical, methodological, and 
related philosophical issues that identify their theories as belonging to a com-
munity of practice whereas respective scholarships maintain somewhat dis-
tinctive views and stances.
The Three Schools of CCO Thinking
The idea of the communicative constitution of organizations (CCO) has 
gained considerable attention in organizational communication studies 
(Ashcraft, Kuhn, & Cooren, 2009; Brummans, Cooren, Robichaud, & Taylor, 
2014; Cooren, Kuhn, Cornelissen, & Clark, 2011; Putnam & Nicotera, 2009). 
The proponents of this theoretical perspective are unified by the idea that 
organizations are invoked and maintained in and through communicative 
practices (Cooren et al., 2011). It follows that if organizations are understood 
first and foremost as communicative phenomena, insights from communica-
tion studies are likely to advance the study of organizations (Putnam, Phillips, 
& Chapman, 1996). In that respect, the CCO perspective has paved the way 
for the increasing incorporation of insights from communication studies into 
the neighboring field of organization studies (see Kuhn, 2012).
Overall, the CCO perspective is a rather heterogeneous theoretical 
endeavor, although its main proponents subscribe to the basic theoretical 
premise that reality is communicatively constituted (Cooren, 2012; Craig, 
1999), which extends to organizations as well (Luhmann, 2000; McPhee & 
Zaug, 2000; Taylor & Van Every, 2000). Brummans et al. (2014) identify 
three main “schools” of current CCO thinking: first, the Montreal School of 
Organizational Communication (e.g., Cooren, Taylor, & Van Every, 2006; 
Taylor & Van Every, 2000); second, the Four-Flows Model (McPhee & 
Zaug, 2000), which is based on Giddens’s Structuration Theory, and third, 
Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems (e.g., Luhmann, 2003; Seidl & Becker, 
2005). Although Ashcraft et al. (2009) list many further works as represen-
tative of an “implicit” CCO perspective (e.g., Deetz, 2005; Monge & 
Contractor, 2003), in this article, we concentrate on these three schools as 
the main representatives of what the same authors call the “explicit” CCO 
view.
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Although the three schools share certain baseline assumptions (e.g., on the 
formative character of language use), they sharply diverge in other respects 
(e.g., on the issues of suitable empirical methodologies and the role of human 
and non-human actors in the CCOs). Presumably also due to its early-stage 
character as a theoretical paradigm, the CCO perspective has been criticized 
for making too bold ontological claims without differentiating sufficiently 
between the kinds of communication that bring forth organization (e.g., Bisel, 
2010) and for offering only vague answers to the question of what distin-
guishes organizations from other social entities, such as movements or com-
munities (Sillince, 2010). In response to these criticisms, we believe that it is 
necessary to engage in further theoretical work at the intersections of the 
three main schools of CCO thinking (Brummans et al., 2014). With the aim 
of demarcating the common ground on which a unified CCO perspective can 
be built, this article provides a systematic comparison of the three schools. A 
first important step in this direction was taken recently by Kuhn (2012) who 
has highlighted the three CCO schools’ potential to bridge micro–macro gaps 
through the communication-centered study of organizations. Our systematic 
comparison aims to further develop these efforts in the form of an interactive, 
dynamic dialogue about the three schools of CCO thinking (in its format 
resembling the recent MCQ article by Koschmann et al., 2012).
The starting point of this article is a historical event: In March 2012, we 
had the honor of hosting a small conference at the University of Hamburg, 
Germany that brought together (most likely for the first time) some of the 
main representatives of all three schools of CCO thinking. Specifically, the 
panel discussion involved François Cooren (representing the Montreal 
School), Robert D. McPhee (representing the Four-Flows Model), and David 
Seidl (representing Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems), as well as Dennis 
Schoeneborn (as a moderator). The panel discussion highlighted various sim-
ilarities and differences among the three strands of CCO thinking. As a 
“chronicle” of this event, our article conveys the essence of the vivid panel 
discussion and provides organizational communication scholars with a sys-
tematic theoretical grounding for further inquiries into the CCOs.
The structure of the article is as follows. First, we have reconstructed an 
interactive dialogue among the panelists from the Hamburg workshop 
(François Cooren, Robert D. McPhee, and David Seidl). Their dialogue is 
structured around guiding questions that address the epistemological, onto-
logical, and methodological dimensions of CCO as a theoretical paradigm. 
Second, on the basis of this dialogue and to provide a systematic comparison 
of the three schools, we (Dennis Schoeneborn and Steffen Blaschke) discuss 
the key similarities and differences between them. Our article concludes with 
an afterword by James R. Taylor in which he reflects on the challenges that 
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the theoretical integration of the three schools presents, as well as on oppor-
tunities for further paradigmatic, theoretical, and empirical inquiries into the 
constitutive character of communication for organizations.
The Three Schools in Dialogue
In the following, we reproduce the main questions and arguments from the 
Hamburg panel on the three schools of CCO thinking. Dennis Schoeneborn 
moderated the discussion and posed the guiding questions (in italics) to our 
three panelists: François Cooren as representative of Montreal School, David 
Seidl as representative of Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems, and Robert 
D. McPhee as representative of the Four-Flows Model along the lines of 
Giddens’s ST.
1. How would you describe the epistemology that underlies the school 
you are representing?
François Cooren: The epistemology that underlies the Montreal School’s 
work could be broadly defined as a relational one. By “relational epistemol-
ogy,” I mean the kind of epistemology that was put forward by pragmatist 
scholars such as Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey and, to a lesser extent, 
William James. A relational or pragmatist epistemology calls into question 
both subjectivism and idealism, on one hand, and empiricism and material-
ism, on the other, by refusing to determine a starting point in the act of know-
ing, inquiring, or investigating. Investigating something—whether that is 
human interaction, atomic particles, or biological organisms—consists of 
engaging with or getting in contact with these objects, which act on us as 
much as we act on them. This type of epistemology is globally compatible 
with Actor Network Theory (Latour, 2005, 2013) and Alfred North 
Whitehead’s Process Philosophy (Whitehead, 1920, 1929).
David Seidl: Although Luhmann (1995) shares the processual understand-
ing of social reality with the Montreal School, he differs markedly in his 
epistemological position that can be described as a form of “radical construc-
tivism” (Luhmann, 2009; Watzlawick, 1984). In contrast to the Montreal 
School that refuses “to determine a starting point in the act of knowing, 
inquiring, or investigating,” there is a clear “starting point” in Luhmann’s 
theory: the observer—a human being, a social system (e.g., an organization), 
or even a machine—and the observations (see Seidl & Becker, 2006). 
Depending on what distinctions the observer uses, he, she, or it will “con-
struct” the world differently. The distinction between system and environ-
ment is central to Luhmann’s theory of social systems. This distinction 
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underlies all his statements about the social world and guides the choice of 
other observational distinctions. Luhmann explicitly acknowledges that the 
choice of observational distinctions is inherently contingent and that there are 
no external criteria for justifying the selection of one distinction over the 
other. Thus, a description of the world cannot be said to be truer or less true 
than others but only more “viable” or less “viable”—that is, it works better 
than others or not quite as well as others. At the same time, Luhmann does not 
deny the actual existence of the external world (i.e., “brute facts” as under-
stood by Searle, 1995). On the contrary, it is the external world that deter-
mines which constructions of reality work and which do not.
Robert D. McPhee: My school is, I suppose, structuration theory (ST)—
though my version has tenets and interpretations that Anthony Giddens, the 
originator of the theory, might well not accept—and, more narrowly, the 
Four-Flows Model of the CCOs. For ST, the key epistemological (and para-
doxical) tenet is probably that epistemology is governed by (social) ontology—
we must know what knowledge is, before deciding how knowledge is gained. 
The second tenet is that knowledge is overwhelmingly an outcome of institu-
tional reflexivity—we gain and certify knowledge mainly through a network 
of institutions that focus on research, as well as through other types of institu-
tions. The third tenet is about agent knowledgeability: People, as capable 
agents, have practical knowledge of their surroundings that is certified by the 
fact that it works, and such knowledge is the basis for the emergence of other 
knowledge and of interpretive resources as well as the communication flows 
that constitute organization. We must remember that ST—like, I would claim, 
social systems theory and the Montreal’s dialectic between text and conver-
sation—is mainly a meta-theory, guiding theorization and methodology with-
out, typically, constituting an explanatory theory. Thus, it could guide inquiry 
into multiple theories about, for instance, the importance of narrative and 
identification in CCO thinking, or about the constitution of formal hierar-
chies (McPhee, 1988).
2. How does each school define communication?
François Cooren: Although there is not necessarily a consensus on this 
question among the representatives of our school, we could say that commu-
nication is, first and foremost, considered an action. Taylor and Van Every 
(2000) also insist on the transactional dimension of communication that 
implies an asymmetry in the act of communicating that creates a sense of 
obligation, debt, or expectation on the part of the persons who are involved in 
an exchange. All representatives of the Montreal School would, I think, also 
agree that communication implies not only an agent and a recipient but also 
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that an agent is always acting on behalf of, in the name of, or for someone or 
something else (that is, a principal). This idea of an “authorized agent” paral-
lels the notion of thirdness, as put forward by Charles Sanders Peirce, but 
also Garfinkel’s idea of accountability. It is also implicit in the “ventriloquist 
thesis” that I promote (Cooren, 2010, 2012). This means that communication 
should not be considered an activity that only concerns human beings. Many 
other things get communicated through what people say, write, or do: emo-
tions, ideas, beliefs, values, positions, but also—and through the latter of 
these—situations, facts, realities, and so on. This way of conceiving of com-
munication is perfectly compatible with the relational thesis, as outlined 
above.
David Seidl: For Luhmann, communication is a particular form of obser-
vation (for a detailed description, see Seidl & Mormann, in press): It is the 
form of observation used by social systems. Building on the speech theories 
of Karl Bühler (1934), Luhmann (1995) conceptualizes communication as a 
synthesis of three components: information, utterance, and understanding. 
These three components together constitute the individual unit of communi-
cation. Luhmann uses the term information to refer to the “what” of a com-
munication. Utterance concerns the “how”—that is, the means by which 
communication is conducted (e.g., the specific words or tone that are used)—
and the “why”—that is, what motivates a communication. Finally, under-
standing refers to the distinction between information and utterance. One has 
to be able to distinguish the utterance from the information; what is commu-
nicated must be distinguished from how and why it is communicated. This 
third component of a communication has a pivotal role because it determines 
the meaning of the communication; that is to say, what is important here is 
not the intended meaning of the communication but how the communication 
is understood. As Luhmann (1995) writes, communication is made possible 
retrospectively, which is “contrary to the temporal course of the process” 
(p. 143). Thus, in contrast to the Montreal School and also to the Four-Flows 
Model, communication is not conceptualized as a kind of action. The concept 
of action would only cover utterance and information but not understanding 
(Luhmann, 1986). It is important to note that Luhmann considers communi-
cation a purely social phenomenon. In this sense, communication has to be 
conceptualized as an emergent phenomenon that arises from the interaction 
between individuals. Extending this line of reasoning, Luhmann argues that 
what matters is not how a particular individual understands a communication 
but how a subsequent communication interprets the preceding communica-
tion it is connected to; only a communicative event can determine the particu-
lar way in which the immediately preceding communicative event is 
understood. For example, from a given answer, you can infer how 
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the respective question has been understood. It follows that the meaning of 
communication is never fixed but shifts with every further communication. It 
is this indeterminacy of the meaning of each instance of communication that 
leads to a continuous production of communication.
Robert D. McPhee: Both these positions fit nicely with the structurational 
emphasis on interaction as the active mutual orientation to others in a given 
context (although the idea of context essentially goes beyond any finite sys-
tem of operations or imbricated units). However, ST also valuably identifies 
the necessary substantive features of communication, arguing that communi-
cation is best understood as a process of symbolic transtruction, where 
“transtruction” means the intermediation of each of four basic dimensions of 
action—signification, domination, legitimation, and constitution (see 
McPhee, 1998)—by the other three dimensions. In other words, communica-
tion is the fused emergence, in symbolic interaction, of meaning—in the first 
instance, as we are talking about communication—power, and its bases: nor-
mative force, and socially or materially constituted systems and contexts. It 
is important to preserve the interpretive emphasis on tacit skill and interac-
tion as achievement, and to avoid the temptations of ideas such as “deep 
structure” and “cognitive schema” as “tools of thought without . . . cognitive 
energy” (Heracleous & Hendry, 2000, p. 1270), which succumb to the agent-
less functionalism that Giddens decried; nevertheless, I think all four dimen-
sions are still useful in that they elaborate the complexity that communication 
involves.
3. What particular kind of communication constitutes organization? 
And how does each school define organization?
François Cooren: Regarding the first question, it all depends on what we 
mean by “organization.” If we mean organizing, then some forms of com-
munication are more directly related to the act of organizing than others. 
Directives and commissives, in the Searlean (1979) typology of speech acts, 
are directly concerned with organizing, because they are, as I said further 
above, what create these effects of submission, imbrication, or embedded-
ness. However, if we now consider organizations per se (i.e., as social enti-
ties), any act of communication can reconstitute for “another next first time” 
(Garfinkel, 2002, p. 182) what an organization is or does. By claiming that 
his or her organization should not be deemed entirely responsible for an eco-
logical disaster (assertive speech act), a spokesperson constitutes that organi-
zation as not entirely liable in this incident (whether or not this claim will be 
accepted is another story, of course. This has to be negotiated through com-
munication). By naming or hiring a manager (declarative speech act), a 
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human resources director will redefine the direction of a department and con-
sequently reconstitute an aspect of his or her organization, and so on. Some 
speech acts certainly are more consequential than others—depending on who 
produces them or what matters they deal with—but they all consist of repro-
ducing or transforming for “another next first time” the organization.
As for the second question, the Montreal School does not hesitate to 
speak of both “organization” and “organizing” to emphasize both the entity-
like and the processual dimension of the phenomenon. Regarding the phe-
nomenon of organizing, this school’s representatives tend to associate it 
with the transactional dimension of communication. Because of the debt or 
obligation created by any act of communication, a response is expected, 
which creates an effect of hierarchy in the contributions. Some contribu-
tions are subsumed under or embedded within others. For instance, let us 
imagine a situation where X asks Y something. Responding to X’s question 
or request implies that Y decides to answer—or not—X’s question or com-
ply or not with X’s request. This response consequently implies that X 
reacts to what Y answered or did for him or her (by thanking or sanctioning 
Y). As we see in this minisequence, communication creates organizing to 
the extent that a sequence of actions—what Y does for X—is subsumed 
under and even embedded within another sequence of action (X asking Y 
something and X thanking or sanctioning Y for what he or she did or said). 
Proponents of the Montreal School argue that these effects of submission, 
imbrications, and embeddedness constitute the essence of organizing (e.g., 
Taylor & Van Every, 2011).
Regarding the question of what defines an organization, the Montreal 
School insists on the necessity to identify in some cases (not all) in the name 
of what collective a series of activities is ultimately done. As James R. Taylor 
often reminds us, the organization needs to look as if it is speaking with one 
voice or acting in unison at some point; otherwise, the term “organization” 
loses its significance. Founding an organization amounts to creating a per-
sonne morale in the name of which some people will be allowed or autho-
rized to speak and act—whether these persons are owners, managers, or 
employees (Taylor & Van Every, in press). More generally, an organization is 
embodied or incarnated, or materializes, in anything or anyone that can be 
recognized as representing it, that is, making it present, whether a spokesper-
son (who speaks on its behalf), a logo (that marks its presence), an employee 
(who works for it), a text (that spells out its policies), a product (that repre-
sents its style, qualities, or character), or a building (that encompasses most 
of its activities). An organization is therefore hybrid: It is made of various 
ontologies that are organized and recognized to a greater or lesser extent. 
Taylor and Van Every (2000) would also say that it is an interrelated network 
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of communication processes, a position that appears, to some extent, compat-
ible with social systems theory.
David Seidl: In contrast to the Montreal School, but in line with the Four-
Flows Model, Luhmann uses the term organization in a narrower, institu-
tional sense. For Luhmann (2003), organizations are one of three generic 
types of social systems; the other two being society (i.e., the system encom-
passing all communication) and face-to-face interactions (i.e., the system 
encompassing communication between people who reflexively perceive each 
other as present). All three types of social systems are conceptualized as 
“autopoietic” (i.e., self-reproducing) communication systems that are able to 
process meaning. They both consist of communication and reproduce their 
communication through the very communication they consist of (Luhmann, 
2005). What distinguishes organizations from other systems is their particu-
lar form of decision communication (or “decisions” in short). This does not 
mean that there are no other forms of communication “in” organizations (e.g., 
gossip), but these forms of communication do not contribute to the autopoi-
etic reproduction of the organization (Luhmann, 2000). Decisions are special 
in that they are “compact communications” (Luhmann, 2000, p. 185) that 
communicate their own contingency. They explicitly communicate that they 
are selections that might have been different, that there are alternatives to 
each selection. Decisions link up to form sequences, where each decision 
serves as a decision premise for following decisions. Accordingly, the orga-
nization is nothing but a network of interrelated processes of decisions con-
necting to other decisions (Blaschke, Schoeneborn, & Seidl, 2012).
Luhmann (2005) emphasizes that decisions are extremely powerful forms 
of communication because they permit the absorption of uncertainty: Every 
decision takes “responsibility” for the risks associated with the selection of 
one alternative over all other possible alternatives. If a decision is accepted, 
it absorbs all the uncertainty that was involved in the decision-making pro-
cess. Ensuing decisions can take the selected alternative as a clear point of 
reference and ignore all the uncertainty that was involved in the original deci-
sion. The capacity of decisions to absorb uncertainty allows organizations to 
fulfill highly complex tasks that would not be possible otherwise.
Luhmann furthermore stresses two important characteristics of organi-
zations that result from the specific form that their communicative repro-
duction takes: First, in contrast to face-to-face interaction systems, but in 
common with the societal system, organizations have the ability to produce 
self-descriptions—for example, in the form of a mission statement—which 
can provide an orientation to organizational communication (Seidl, 2005)—
something that is also stressed by the Montreal School. Second, in contrast 
to both society and face-to-face interaction systems, organizations have the 
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ability to communicate with other systems in their environment, as they can 
authorize (i.e., decide on) spokespersons to communicate “on behalf of” the 
organization. Accordingly, it is possible to attribute communication to the 
organization (Luhmann, 2000). For example, a CEO can speak to members 
of other organizations representing his or her organization. This echoes 
some of the assumptions of the Montreal School and the emphasis they 
place on the possibilities of speaking “on behalf of” the organization 
(Cooren, 2010).
Robert D. McPhee: I would accept, tentatively, Giddens’s (1984) defini-
tion of organizations as “collectivities in which the reflexive regulation of the 
conditions of system reproduction looms large in the continuity of day-to-day 
practices” (p. 200). Central here is the flow of reflexive self-structuring, for 
example, the processes of creating a broadly known membership boundary 
and determining its permeability, and of gathering information about and pur-
posefully designing the relations among members. However, the Four-Flows 
Model (McPhee & Iverson, 2009; McPhee & Zaug, 2000) also notes assem-
blages of communication processes that may contribute to “flows” of (a) 
membership negotiation, including especially processes that relate individu-
als to organizations as identifiable systems—such as role learning, power 
accumulation, identification, and disidentification; (b) activity coordination, 
that is, especially, processes of immediate, contextualized mutual adjustment 
to the activities of others in ways not totally guided by (c) reflexive self-
structuring (described just above); and (d) institutional positioning, that is, 
especially, processes of individual communication that generate relations 
between any specified organization and its array of competitors, regulators, 
and so on, and the more extensive institutional system—for example, 
capitalism.
Importantly, flows may constitute organizations as flawed or disintegrat-
ing; and they can and nearly always do overlap. The Four-Flows distinc-
tions seem, as we hope, to valuably cut across meta-theories—they could 
be, for instance, four dimensions of imbrications or actant-relations exhib-
iting ventriloquism in varied ways. And the flows have a tone similar to that 
of Luhmann’s “function systems,” with Parsons’ theorizing as a common 
ancestor. In addition, similar to Luhmann, for ST scholars, organizations 
are systems with boundaries. Organizations can be seen as attaining—com-
municatively—“a level of effective integration that allows a set of people 
engaged in social practices to be realistically identifiable as an organiza-
tion” (McPhee & Iverson, 2009, p. 62).
4. How do local interactions “scale up” to form organizations (i.e., how 
are the micro-and meso-levels linked)?
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François Cooren: My position, which follows Latour’s, is that the notion 
of “level” is somewhat misleading. It is part of our vocabulary, so it means 
that it is useful to speak about various levels of discussions, activities, or even 
realities. For instance, we speak about “the level of the upper management’s 
world” versus “the level of the shop floor.” However, even if these different 
levels do exist, they are all produced, maintained, and cultivated by interac-
tions and transactions. Upper managers talk to and work with each other as 
much as workers talk to and work with each other to get things done. They 
form different communities of practice that represent different values, con-
cerns, norms, and so on. The effects of hierarchy and levels, which are real, 
come from the transactional character of communication, which I already 
alluded to. Some activities are embedded, imbricated within, or subsumed 
under others. When an organization speaks, it is usually through an autho-
rized spokesperson who speaks on its behalf. It can also be through a press 
release or a website. When an organization acts, it can be through the contri-
bution of an employee who is authorized to work in its name. As we see, there 
is a change of level, but the rubber needs to hit the road somewhere, which 
means that we cannot ever leave, by definition, the terra firma of interaction. 
“Scaling up” is therefore something that actors themselves do. In the same 
conversation, someone can start speaking as an individual and then end his or 
her turn of talk by positioning himself or herself as speaking as a CEO. It is 
this kind of “scaling up” or “scaling down” that we find so interesting.
David Seidl: Luhmann would agree that levels do not exist by themselves 
but are the product of communication. Yet, Luhmann’s notion of levels is 
probably more traditional than that of the Montreal School and more in line 
with Giddens’s and the Four-Flows Model. Luhmann’s (1986) organization 
theory addresses the link between the micro-level of individual units of com-
munication and the meso-level of the organization as a system: Because the 
meaning of each communication is defined by another communication, each 
communication only exists as part of a larger network of interconnected com-
municative events. Every communication calls forth further communications 
and is itself the product of preceding communications. Furthermore, by dis-
tinguishing between the other communications to which it connects and those 
to which it does not connect, it reproduces the distinction between those ele-
ments that belong to the network and those that do not. In other words, com-
munication reproduces the boundary of the system. For example, every single 
decision in an organization differentiates between other decisions that belong 
to the organization—and are therefore binding for the focal decision—and 
other decisions that belong to other social systems.
Robert D. McPhee: I worry that a tacit assumption behind the term scale 
up is that organization is a matter of scale—that we wind up with 
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organizations if we look at more, or more widespread, or more collective 
(denoted by “we”), or more connected or patterned networks of interaction. 
No; complex organizations must be constituted by multiple definite kinds of 
communication in multiple times and places, but that communication genera-
tively structures (“distanciates”) the relations among times and spaces in 
ways that constitute the organization. At this point, we must address the 
“composition problem” (Kuhn, 2012), of how “systems of relations and prac-
tices become constituted as organizations, despite (or perhaps through?) the 
distance in space and time, the conflict and anomie, and the diversity and 
fragmentation, that are characteristic of organizational systems” (McPhee & 
Iverson, 2009, p. 55), and equally, of how scattered instances of communica-
tion without sufficient linkage characteristics do not constitute organizations. 
In a recent article, Heather Canary and I (McPhee & Canary, 2013) argue that 
the phenomenon of “distanciation” is crucial to solving that problem, specifi-
cally by generating emergent patterns and boundaries that “count” as time 
and space, organizationally and societally.
5. How do organizations and society interrelate (i.e., how are the meso- 
and macro-levels linked)?
François Cooren: For me, organizations and society can only relate 
through their representatives, whether human or non-human. For instance, 
governments control the activities of organizations not only through specific 
laws and rules that dictate how companies should function and operate but 
also through, for example, comptrollers acting on the government’s behalf 
and capable of enforcing these laws and rules. If we think of cultures as rep-
resentative of specific collectives, we can also acknowledge and study how 
what is cultivated—habits, values, norms of conduct, and so on—comes to 
pervade the functioning of an organization.
David Seidl: In contrast to both the Montreal School and the Four-Flows 
Model, Luhmann (2012) has a specific conceptualization of society as the 
all-encompassing social system that contains all communication. Each and 
every communication is part of the society and, as such, reproduces it. This 
holds true also for organizational communications: Organizational communi-
cations reproduce both the organization and the society at large. Yet, these 
communications have different meanings in the context of each system, that 
is, they make a “different difference” to each system. In the context of the 
organization, they have a more specific meaning than they do in the context 
of the society at large. Organizational communication uses the various spe-
cific modes of communication that society holds in stock to produce specific 
decisions. Courts, for example, draw on communication codified in a legal 
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format to produce individual legal decisions and corporations draw largely on 
communication codified in a financial format to produce their business deci-
sions. Although all communications of an organization are part of society, not 
all societal communications are also part of the organization; that is, there are 
also societal communications in the environment of the organization, such as 
communications by other organizations or non-organizational forms of com-
munication (e.g., interactions). In this sense, we can say that society partly 
takes place inside and partly outside of the organization. This kind of com-
munication that takes place outside the organization might cause “perturba-
tions” within the organization; however, it cannot become part of the 
self-reproduction of the organization.
Luhmann (2012) argued that the emergence of organizations as a new type 
of social system was a precondition for the modern, functionally differenti-
ated society. For example, organizations can compensate to some extent for 
the uncertainty and complexity that stem from the fact that society lacks a 
communicative center (Drepper, 2005). Although modern society is differen-
tiated into functional subsystems (such as the economic system, the legal 
system, the scientific system, or the political system) with competing orienta-
tions, because organizations operate via decision communications, they have 
the capacity to provide clear directions to their internal communication pro-
cesses. Importantly, organizations can provide a “substitute address” for 
communication directed to different functional subsystems of society that 
themselves do not have the ability to communicate in their own name. In 
other words, we find in most functional subsystems important organizations 
that we might address instead of the functional subsystem as such. For exam-
ple, one cannot communicate with the economic system, legal system, or the 
political system, but one can communicate with trade associations, supreme 
courts, or states.
Robert D. McPhee: The Four-Flows Model emphasizes that any one orga-
nization exists in the context of high modernity (Giddens, 1990) and, thus, 
structurates a position in, notably, the changing institutional context of this 
era. Any such structuration rests on the activity of organizational members, 
who must “mangle out” the practical meaning of the environment, of the 
organization–environment link, and of the boundary between organization 
and environment. We must be careful to add that all four flows connect orga-
nization and “society” in varied ways.
6. What is the role of materiality and non-human actors in the CCO?
François Cooren: For me, materiality and non-human agency refer to two 
different things. Materiality comes from the Latin word materia, which 
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means “the substance from which something is made” or the “grounds, rea-
son, or cause for something.” When we speak of materiality, we thus implic-
itly refer to what stands under something, what might explain its mode of 
being or existence. In connection to the CCO, we see that the question of 
materiality would thus refer to what or even who stands under the organiza-
tion, so to speak; that is, what makes the organization what it is: spokesper-
sons, employees, managers, buildings, operations, logos, texts, and so on. All 
these things and persons act and communicate on behalf of the organization; 
they embody or materialize it, even if this embodiment or materialization is 
always negotiable communicatively.
Regarding the question of non-human agency, we see that, indeed, arti-
facts have a big role to play in the communicative constitution of an organiza-
tion. They matter a lot. They count. They display agency to the extent that 
they “make a difference.” They communicate how an organization is per-
ceived and experienced—think of buildings, machines, and logos, for 
instance. They express their missions, official positions, and policies—think 
of texts and web sites. However, I have to say that I am always ambivalent 
about the term non-human, because a text, a machine, or a website is some-
thing that is, in many respects, extremely human. I prefer to simply name 
these things that participate in the mode of communicating of an organization 
a mission statement, a logo, a building, a policy, a directive, a memo, and so 
on. All these things are human and non-human. They actively participate in 
what stands under or supports any organization (which is also human and 
non-human).
David Seidl: In Luhmann’s theory, material objects, in the conventional 
sense, are treated as part of the organization’s environment. They are not part 
of the organization. This is an important distinction from the Montreal 
School, of course. According to Luhmann, material objects only become 
socially relevant to the extent that they affect communication. There are three 
ways in which they might do that. First, material objects might be addressed 
in the organizational communication, that is, the communication might be 
about material objects. Second, material objects might affect the communica-
tion in the form of “perturbations.” For example, the impending departure of 
a train—the material object—might cause a “perturbation” in a face-to-face 
communication prompting the participants to say goodbye. Third, material 
objects might feature as part of the utterance. For example, in soccer, show-
ing a red card is a means of conveying the information that a player is sent off 
the field. In contrast to material objects, “non-human actors” (although 
Luhmann would not have used this particular term) play an important role in 
Luhmann’s organization theory when it comes to the organization itself (see 
Schoeneborn, 2011): Luhmann conceives of the organization as a system that 
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is capable of observation and communication—as are society and face-to-
face interaction systems. In this sense, he attributes to the organization many 
qualities that are usually only associated with human beings.
Robert D. McPhee: Of course, non-human things, forces, and contexts are 
of huge significance in all of human life, including organizations, and many 
theories pay insufficient attention to them. One of the bases of my theorizing, 
contingency theory (e.g., Perrow, 1967), has put technology and its objects at 
the core of explanations of how organizations and communication are linked. 
Indeed, the interpretive revolution in our field (Putnam & Pacanowsky, 1983) 
was a move away from direct material effects, toward interpretive mediation. 
More directly, I think ST gives a significant and proper place to non-human 
“actors” while emphasizing the agentive powers of humans in communica-
tive contexts. More broadly, phenomena referred to by the term “materiality” 
are discussed both in ST by means of concepts such as practice, resources, 
constraints (and thus enablements), and conditions that contextualize and 
existentially modify life (see McPhee & Iverson, 2011), as well as in correla-
tive subtheories, such as “communities of practice” (Iverson & McPhee, 
2008) and “activity systems” (Canary, 2010; Canary & McPhee, 2009). We 
argue that these terms retheorize “the material” in ways that are powerfully 
integrated with broad social scientific concerns. However, we must remem-
ber that rehabilitating “non-human elements” and recognizing systems that 
are not reducible to (unorganized bunches of) human agents are theoretic 
moves that do not demand the minimization of the difference between human 
agents (who alone can understand communications) and other elements and 
systems.
7. What is the role of individual human actors in the CCO?
François Cooren: This question gives me the opportunity to be very clear 
on the question of human agency. For me, the human actor is an obligatory 
passage point in everything I have been talking about so far. If a logo com-
municates something in the name of an organization, it is not only because its 
designers might have meant it that way (sometimes, they can miss the point) 
but also because someone is able to make it say something when he or she 
sees it. If a policy can have some bearing over what people do in an organiza-
tion, it is because people know what it says or that other will make it say 
something in specific circumstances. The organizational world is, of course, 
a world where humans play a key role, to the extent that they are the ones 
who mobilize or “ventriloquize” texts, values, and facts in their discourse. 
What I want to point out is that humans are not only ventriloquists, in that 
they make, for instance, policies say something in specific circumstances but 
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also ventriloquized, in that these policies lead them to say specific things and 
not other things. There is no absolute starting point because we live in a rela-
tional world.
David Seidl: Luhmann’s view of the role of human agency is quite distinct 
from that of the Montreal School and also from that of the Four-Flows Model, 
as it seems to me. To start with, this is evident in his conceptualization of the 
human being as a conglomerate that comprises organic systems (e.g., the 
nervous systems, immune system, etc.) and a psychic system (i.e., the human 
mind), which are distinct autopoietic systems. The psychic system (i.e., the 
mind) is the most important one with regard to social systems. It is a system 
that reproduces itself on the basis of thoughts, that is, analogously to the con-
ceptualization of social systems, psychic systems are conceptualized as self-
reproducing systems of thoughts. As separate autopoietic systems, psychic 
systems are located in the environment of the organization. Thus, they do not 
constitute part of the organization and cannot contribute to its autopoietic 
reproduction. Psychic systems and the organization are operatively closed in 
relation to each other: Psychic systems can only produce thoughts that pro-
duce further thoughts but they cannot produce communication (for a detailed 
description of the relation between social and psychic systems, see Luhmann, 
2002). Similarly, organizations can only produce decisions that produce fur-
ther decisions but they cannot produce thoughts. Nevertheless, although 
these systems are operatively closed, they can still influence each other by 
causing “perturbations” in each other. Although organizations reproduce 
themselves exclusively by communication, they depend on psychic systems 
for their reproduction. Luhmann (1995, 2002) refers to this relation between 
psychic and social systems as “interpenetration.” For example, social sys-
tems depend on psychic systems for the perception of utterances—social sys-
tems themselves cannot hear, talk, or read texts. Furthermore, psychic systems 
can help the organization memorize communicative events beyond the 
momentary point of these events’ occurrence. Social systems are (structur-
ally) coupled to psychic systems in the sense that they can count on the com-
munications to cause perturbations in the participating psychic systems and 
to receive perturbations from the psychic systems, in turn. In particular, they 
can expect psychic systems to trigger further communications after every 
communication. As Luhmann (2002) writes, “The mind cannot instruct com-
munication, because communication constructs itself. But the mind is a con-
stant source of impulses for the one or the other turn of the operative process 
inherent in communication” (pp. 176-177).
Robert D. McPhee: Individual human actors communicate, and they are 
the only beings that do so (in the fullest sense of the term), in part because 
they have the powers listed above. I am persuaded by Charles Taylor’s 
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arguments about human agency being impossible for, machines for example. 
That being said, I think the phenomena that François Cooren refers to as 
“ventriloquism” can be compatible with and valuably inform ST. However, 
that is contingent on accepting that human agents’ interpretive systems 
include resources that lead an individual to think of himself or herself as able 
to (fallaciously) speak for, or even to be, an organization. We must remind 
ourselves, as scholars, that such speech does not in itself, or even mainly, 
constitute an organization, and can be delusional or involve unusual registers 
in a number of theoretically interesting ways—and humans do draw on arrays 
of structural resources that have definite affinities to Luhmann’s (1995) 
notion of communication systems.
8. What methodologies are the most suitable to studying the CCO?
François Cooren: One of the most promising methodologies is shadow-
ing, in particular video-shadowing, which is something that very few 
researchers seem to mobilize, unfortunately—curiously, one of the most 
renowned management scholars, Henry Mintzberg, started his career by 
using this approach. I wish others had tried to follow in his steps! Why video-
shadowing? Because it is the only way I know that allows me to access as 
faithfully as possible what happens on the terra firma of interaction. When 
you are following people and projects, the question of macro-, meso-, and 
micro-levels starts to lose its significance. When I record a meeting between 
an MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières) representative and a military officer in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I not only observe Mr. X meeting 
Mr. Y but also notice how MSF and the United Nations Organization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) speak to each other. Is 
it a micro-event or a macro-event? Both, of course, and this illustrates why 
“scaling up” is something that not only we, as analysts, but also actors more 
generally do. At some point, for instance, the MSF representative will switch 
from speaking on behalf of MSF to speaking on his or her own behalf; some-
times in the same turn of talk. It is these moments that I find so interesting, 
because these show how and why the detailed study of communication is so 
crucial to understanding the mode of being and functioning of our world.
David Seidl: The particular epistemological and ontological assumptions 
underlying Luhmann’s approach to social systems have specific methodologi-
cal implications that differ to some extent from those of the Montreal School 
and the Four-Flows Model. Epistemologically, Luhmann starts with the 
assumption that the outside world does exist but is unknown to us. All descrip-
tions of the world are constructions of an observer, whether a social or psychic 
system (Luhmann, 2009). This also applies to all empirical descriptions of the 
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social world. There is no possibility of describing the social world as it is. Thus, 
when social researchers study organizations, the respective descriptions are 
merely constructions resulting from the specific observational distinctions 
applied. This, first of all, means that researchers should acknowledge and make 
explicit the specific observational distinctions that are applied in their empirical 
observations. Second, it implies that, rather than separating the empirical obser-
vations from the theory, one should use the conceptual distinctions provided by 
the theory for one’s empirical observations (Besio & Pronzini, 2010). 
Otherwise, one ends up with empirical descriptions that are produced on the 
basis of different observational distinctions from those on which the theory is 
based, which is comparing apples and oranges. Ontologically, Luhmann starts 
with the assumption that the social world consists of communication. 
Consequently, empirical research needs to be directed at communication rather 
than at actors. There is a wide range of different methodological approaches 
that seem suitable for capturing the specificities of organizational communica-
tions, such as studying chains of decisions or examining semantics (for an 
overview, see Besio & Pronzini, 2010).
Robert D. McPhee: ST is quite catholic about methods, not least because 
of its epistemology. That being said, I think that interpretive or critical meth-
ods (including both discourse-focused and ethnographic methods) demon-
strate structurational processes more easily than standard quantitative 
methods. That also being said, I think specific theories give much more direc-
tion in the choice of method than ST, which is a meta-theory. For instance, ST 
has shown the important applicability of (largely quantitative) interaction 
analysis for understanding the use of technology in decision making.
Systematic Comparison of the Three Schools
Using the above dialogue as a basis, we can delimit the common ground that 
the three schools of CCO thinking share. Furthermore, we highlight crucial 
differences among them. More specifically, in the following systematic com-
parison, we cover four main areas: (a) epistemology and ontology, (b) the 
notion of communication, (c) the relation between organization and commu-
nication, and (d) the question of human and non-human agency.
Epistemology and Ontology
All three schools of CCO thinking start off with the same premise: 
Communication is not just a peripheral epiphenomenon of human actions but 
the primary mode of explaining social reality (Craig, 1999). Cooren (2012), 
as one of the main representatives of the Montreal School, expresses this 
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basic premise when he refers to the “communicative constitution of reality.” 
Essentially, he proposes that communication is
more than an explanandum, that is, something that ought to be explained by our 
models or theories, but that it also be considered an explanans, that is, 
something that explains how our world is what it is and how it functions. (p. 2)
Luhmann (1995) similarly presumes that self-referential systems of commu-
nication essentially constitute social reality. Accordingly, understanding 
social reality requires studying how social systems unfold and evolve as com-
munication processes, how they reproduce themselves, and how they estab-
lish self-referential boundaries between themselves and their environment, as 
well as other social systems. ST in the interpretation of McPhee and his col-
leagues simultaneously sees social reality as a construction of organizations 
and their members and as a confrontation to them that requires interpretation 
(McPhee & Zaug, 2001). Organizations and their members rely on communi-
cation to arrive at a mutually acceptable account of social reality and deal 
with its respective uncertainty.
Notwithstanding the focus on communication as an explanans across all 
three schools, the dialogue also reveals important epistemological and onto-
logical differences that separate them. These differences mainly concern the 
question of whether the objective material reality is actually observable. At 
one end of the continuum, there is Luhmann’s (1995) theory of social sys-
tems. Seidl highlights the self-referential closure of social systems with 
respect to their environment as the main implication of Luhmann’s notion of 
autopoiesis. From that perspective, observations (including scientific inqui-
ries) are exclusively an operation that organizations perform and are neces-
sarily subject to proactive construction through communication. These ideas 
are rooted in a social constructivist stance and rest on the assumption that the 
distinction between a system and its environment is an essential precondition 
for observing reality. At the other end, there are the scholars of the Montreal 
School, who explicitly oppose more radical forms of constructivism and 
instead presuppose the existence and observability of an objective material 
reality, although its perception is always mediated by communication:
Advocating a communicative constitution of reality does not amount to falling 
into some degenerate form of constructivism (or even solipsism). It means, on 
the contrary, that, for instance, preoccupations, realities, and situations get 
expressed and translated in what we say or write. And these expressions, 
animations or translations can, of course, always be questioned and negotiated 
on the terra firma of interaction. (Cooren, 2012, p. 12)
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ST falls somewhere in between the two extremes. However, it leans rather 
toward the social constructivism of Luhmann’s social systems theory, grasp-
ing social reality in a similar way as produced and reproduced in discourse 
(Giddens, 1984).
The Notion of Communication
Scholars across all three schools of CCO thinking are united in that their defi-
nitions of communication extend beyond the transmission view of communi-
cation (Axley, 1984): All emphasize the inherently dynamic, precarious, and 
ultimately indeterminate character of (verbal or non-verbal) communication 
(Cooren et al., 2011). According to Ashcraft et al. (2009), the minimum con-
sensus among scholars within CCO thinking is that communication “entails 
the dynamic, interactive negotiation of meaning through symbol use” (p. 6). 
However, if we take a more fine-grained look at the three schools’ respective 
notions of communication, we can see that each sheds light on different 
aspects of the communication process.
On the basis of the notion of autopoiesis, Luhmann (1995) emphasizes the 
self-reproducing character of communication. According to his view, com-
munication occurs as a synthesis of three selections: On one hand, the selec-
tion of a specific piece of information and of an utterance that can be attributed 
to an individual human actor, which Luhmann designates as alter, and on the 
other hand, the selection of a particular way of understanding that can be 
attributed to another human actor, which Luhmann designates as ego 
(Luhmann, 1992). Most importantly, the meaning of communication is 
defined by the network of communications (Blaschke et al., 2012), not by the 
understanding of the individuals involved.
In contrast, scholars of the Montreal School object to the notion that com-
munication necessarily requires the involvement of human actors and symbol 
use. Instead, these scholars propose to apply a notion of communication that 
is as wide as possible and that is sensitive for the communicative involve-
ment of actors of all kinds, including non-human entities (e.g., Cooren, 2006). 
Proponents of the Montreal School comprehend communication as a transac-
tional process that involves at least two roles: A and B interacting in relation 
to an object X. An organization or “meta-conversation” (Robichaud, Giroux, 
& Taylor, 2004) emerges when A speaks on behalf of the collective AB. In 
addition to human actors, other (non-human) entities or “figures” (Cooren, 
2010) may enter communicative relations. A second difference is that, while 
Luhmann’s social systems theory places particular emphasis on the symbolic 
dimension of communication, and the Montreal School ascribes particular 
importance to the material dimension of communication processes (that is, to 
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their manifestations in texts, tools, or other artifacts), Giddens’s ST features 
the symbolic as intersecting material and other dimensions of sociality. This 
also reflects the epistemological and ontological differences that were identi-
fied earlier, as well as the question of non-human agency that is discussed 
further below.
The Relation Between Organization and Communication
The strongest commonality among the three schools, however, is the pre-
sumed link between organization and communication. All three schools are 
fundamentally grounded in the assumption that the organization does not pre-
date communication but emerges and perpetuates itself as a network of inter-
locking communication events (Blaschke et al., 2012; Taylor & Van Every, 
2000) or “flows” (McPhee & Zaug, 2000). Furthermore, CCO scholars share 
the idea that organization and communication are mutually constituted in an 
attributive relationship: In other words, communication is performed “in the 
name of” or “on behalf of” the organization (e.g., Taylor & Cooren, 1997) 
and, through this attribution, ultimately evokes organization as a processual 
entity.
Despite these similarities, however, a closer look again reveals that the 
devil is in the details: The above dialogue clearly shows that the three schools 
differ markedly on the question of “what makes communication organiza-
tional” (Taylor & Cooren, 1997). For Luhmann, the organization only comes 
into being through the interconnection of decision-related communications 
over time; that is, when an earlier decision communication serves as a deci-
sion premise for further decision communications (Luhmann, 2000; Seidl, 
2005). McPhee and Zaug (2000), in turn, open up this somewhat narrow 
focus on decisions by identifying four interrelated flows of communication 
that, collectively, give rise to organization. Broadening the notion of organi-
zational communication even more, scholars of the Montreal School assume 
that speech acts of all kinds that are enacted on behalf of an organization 
(Cooren, 2004) have the capacity to form and maintain the collective endeavor 
(Taylor & Cooren, 1997).
Recent works in CCO thinking point out ways of achieving further inte-
gration among the three schools with respect to the link between organization 
and communication: For instance, Luhmann’s social systems theory serves as 
a starting point for the conceptual argument by Christensen, Morsing, and 
Thyssen (2013) on the role of communication in corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR); however, the authors go beyond these premises to embrace aspects 
of CCO as a broader theoretical endeavor. The authors argue that not only 
decisions but also other types of performative speech acts, such as promises 
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(or, in their vocabulary, “aspirational talk”), play a key role in the communi-
cative constitution of organizations, not the least by projecting a future state 
that may pave the way for its own realization (see also Haack, Schoeneborn, 
& Wickert, 2012).
The Question of Human and Non-Human Agency
Finally, all three schools decenter the agency of human actors and acknowl-
edge—each in its own way—the importance of non-human agency. The broad-
est notion of agency is reflected in Cooren’s (2004) definition of agency as the 
“capability to ‘make a difference’, that is, to exercise some sort of power” 
(p. 389). Texts, tools, or other material objects are endowed with communica-
tive agency as soon as they are acknowledged, mobilized, or foregrounded in 
the context of language use. Interestingly, the Montreal School’s notion of non-
human agency exhibits some striking parallels to Luhmann’s (1995) social sys-
tems theory, as Schoeneborn (2011) argues. Although Luhmann (1992) would 
disagree with the idea that material objects can communicate, his theoretical 
works nevertheless underscore the importance and agency of non-human enti-
ties: The communication process itself forms autopoietic social systems by 
establishing a boundary and forming a self-referential network of communica-
tion events that produce or trigger further communication events; these, in turn, 
gain agency in their own right. Although material objects can be addressed and 
their meaning can be negotiated through communication, Luhmann would not 
go as far as to ascribe agency to these objects. Again, ST comes closer to 
Luhmann’s social systems theory in this regard, in that it ascribes explanatory 
importance to the agency of established structures, practices, and institutions 
that enable and constrain the agency of humans (Giddens, 1984).
Concluding Remarks
Table 1 summarizes the key similarities and differences that we have identi-
fied between the three schools. This systematic comparison is intended to 
serve as a basis that will allow organizational communication scholars to 
reflect and elaborate on the further theoretical integration of the CCO per-
spective while acknowledging the heterogeneity of its origins, at the same 
time. Given the identified differences, the CCO perspective can be seen as 
evidence for one of its own theoretical premises, that is, that organizational 
collectives are fundamentally driven by dissensus (rather than consensus) as 
a driving force of their communicative perpetuation (see also Whelan, 2013). 
Nevertheless, we identified one powerful idea that unites all three schools of 
CCO thinking and we believe that it deserves further transversal exploration, 
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namely, the idea that organizations do not predate communication but come 
into being through attributive relations, that is, via recurrent communicative 
processes that attribute actorhood to the organizational endeavor (Luhmann, 
2000; McPhee & Zaug, 2000; Taylor & Van Every, 2000). In this regard, the 
CCO approach as a paradigmatic perspective (that also includes further 
important works beyond the three schools; see the overview by Ashcraft et 
al., 2009) has the potential to fruitfully contribute to some of the fundamental 
questions of organization theory, such as “what is an organization?” or “what 
is unique about organizations with respect to other social phenomena?” (see 
also King, Felin, & Whetten, 2010).
Afterword
by James R. Taylor (University of Montreal)
In a book published in 1979, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity, 
Gregory Bateson (1979) outlined what he considered to be the criteria that we 
need to explain thinking or the “phenomena of thought,” as he put it (pp. 
97-98). Here they are:
1. an aggregate of interacting parts or components,
2. interaction triggered by differences,
3. requiring collateral energy,
4. circular (or more complex) chains of determination,
5. the effects of difference to be regarded as transforms (i.e., coded ver-
sions) of events that preceded them,
6. the description and classification of those processes of transformation 
disclose a hierarchy of logical types immanent in the phenomena.
Bateson, an anthropologist, was careful not to limit thought to that which 
occurs in the individual human brain. It is not the materialization of thought 
in an individual intelligence that defines it but the pattern of communication 
it exemplifies.
In the words of the Chilean biologists, Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela (1987), the authors of the theory of autopoiesis, what is critical to 
understanding scientific communication is to see it as “the coordinated 
behaviors mutually triggered among the members of a social unity” (p. 193). 
“Consciousness and mind,” they wrote, “belong to the realm of social cou-
pling” (1987, p. 234). For Maturana (1991), all science is sustained by “lan-
guaging,” and culminates in “domains of explanation” (p. 30). Science is a 
social activity whose validation is that its contributions are authored by “stan-
dard observers,” recognized as members of a community of scientists. Taylor 
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and Van Every (2000) drew this inference from Maturana’s 1991 essay: The 
identity of the members of an organization, they wrote, is
contingent on the existence of a cognitive domain within which the enacting 
gives rise to identities . . . Communication is not a strictly symbolic phenomenon, 
but also has a material basis in the enacting of what it reports without which the 
communication would not be authentic. (pp. 270-271)
That is not the usual way in which we have construed thinking in our civi-
lization, thanks to René Descartes and to generations of psychologists who 
have followed him since. Thinking, for them, is supposed to be what goes on 
in the head. Artificial intelligence, when it emerged, only served to reinforce 
the same idea. However, there is an alternative: Thinking is what a commu-
nity of shared practice is doing.
Consider the “three pillars” of the theory of the CCO in this light: They all 
identify with “domains of explanation” that will account for the phenomenon 
of human organization. Consider also the Hamburg conference: There were 
“interacting parts” (the participants), their interaction exposed differences, 
their interventions required energy, and the discussion was circular in its 
“chains of determination.” There were “versions of preceding events” and “a 
hierarchy of logical types immanent in the phenomenon” they were focused 
on, organization.
For the Montreal School, to say that organization is “emergent” means not 
that it ever emerges as a transcendent entity, but rather that its existence is 
forever contingent on its construction in the recalcitrant material world that is 
the continuing preoccupation of its members (its “enactment”; Weick, 1979) 
and mediated by discursive interactions—the conversations and texts—that 
enable people to make sense of their experience, what the pragmatist Charles 
Sanders Peirce called “thirdness” (Taylor & Van Every, 2011, in press).
McPhee and his associates choose a different point of entry into the dia-
logue. They ask instead what we need to explain if we are to account for 
organization: how members are mobilized, how the organization’s purposes 
are constructed in dialogue, how membership is explained to start with, and 
how the organization, once identified as an actor, interacts with other actors 
in its larger society.
Those who trace their intellectual origin to the sociologist Luhmann have still 
another question in mind: How does the flow of acts of communication (“deci-
sions”) come to take on systemic properties, and then, how does the resulting 
system itself become an actor, in an environment, capable of entering the pro-
cesses of interaction of its members as a constituent actor in its own right?
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I have no idea how this dialogue will eventually work out. What is impor-
tant is that it is now a collective engagement: It encompasses members of a 
scientific community that identifies itself as such and enforces on its think-
ing, as Maturana perceived, a discipline of dialogue, in that the members 
must frame their explanations intelligently, as the word “intelligent” is under-
stood by their community. There is a real change—and a new challenge. Bob 
McPhee and I have been carrying on an on-and-off dialogue for the best part 
of two decades, not infrequently arguing over this or that point. I first wrote 
about Luhmann in a Communication Theory article (Taylor, 1995), but it is 
only lately that his work has taken on the salience it now has for me. What is 
happening now is different: the constitution of a collective mind at work. I 
look forward to what comes next.
The current theories do not quite match up. Each involves a different set 
of beliefs. Nobody is going to change their mind easily. As Peirce (1877/1955) 
wrote,
We cling tenaciously, not merely to believing, but to believing just what we do 
believe . . . We think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is a mere 
tautology to say so . . . The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for 
the struggle to attain belief . . . the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of 
belief. (pp. 10-11)
However,
The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate 
the mind to any struggle to attain belief . . . Unless we make ourselves hermits, 
we shall necessarily influence each other’s opinions; so the problem becomes 
how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community. (p. 13)
The Hamburg conference was a community at work.
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